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Article 5

Book Reviews
Ambition and Privilege: The Social Tropes of Elizabethan Courtesy Theory by
Frank Whigham. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1984. Pp. xiii + 257, 2 figures. $27.00.
Although More's Utopia has no place in Frank Whigham's discussion of
the view of society articulated in courtesy literature, Raphael Hythloday's
condemnation of the "conspiracy of the rich, who pursue their own aggrandizement under the name and title of the Commonwealth" comes close to
the thesis argued in this singlerninded study. As Whigham sees it, the literature of courtesy served an ideological function, to ascribe privilege, to channel ambition, and to maintain the fiction of a status quo in a society menaced
by social advancement and increasing social mobility, a situation Whigham is
fond of calling "convection." "The motor of life at court was the pursuit of
power and privilege" (p. 20), Whigham writes, and courtesy literature provided (in Kenneth Burke's terms) "equipment for living," a coding of the rhetorical tropes that governed the "scramble" for place and power. According
to Whigham, life at court offered the paranoid existence of a theatricality
played in a hall of mirrors, an infinite regress in which one was never secure
from others' eyes, or sure in one's actions or interpretations of others' behavior-or one's own. In such a "hothouse," Whigham argues, courtesy literature provided a set of strategies for "image management" (style is all)
governed by a trope Whigham borrows from Puttenham, paradiastole, making the best of a bad thing, a trope of mystification that, on the one hand,
bends all actions to one's benefits and, on the other, abuses the similar actions of rivals and enemies. "Personal promotion" and "personal rivalry" are
the end products of the view that Whigham offers in the final hundred pages
of his book, after setting the scene with a discussion of the social matrix of a
(limited) class warfare, its rhetorical embodiment in texts like Castiglione or
Elyot, and its overriding view of a hierarchical world of privilege to be maintained and manipulated. Hythloday might speak here, reviling courts "made
up of those who envy all others and admire themselves," a society in which
"every man gets as much as he can for himself by one device or another."
These devices are Whigham's "tropes" of social mystification and dissimulation in the service of self-promotion.
As Whigham admits, the view he offers grows out of work done in the
past few years that has countered the Burkhardtian view of the artifice of
self-construction ("the perfecting of the individual") with a more finely tuned
awareness of the politics of self-fashioning. Against an idealizing tradition,
however, Whigham offers an opposing view equally extreme in its sourness
and debunking. If once courts were regarded as the flowering of aristocratic
leisure, for Whigham they are places of the most intense work, governed by
the rigors of combative competition, plagued by anxieties, motivated by an
overwhelming and inescapable bad faith. Ideology, as Raymond Williams has
written, is capable of many interpretations; Whigham espouses the hard line
in which the only face ideology wears is a false' one, the only consciousness
false consciousness. The court, he tells his readers, plays a confidence game.
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In this view, the only "substance" of court life is its manufacturing and commodification of a style, the securing for oneself of the privilege and power
that comes from being a member of the ruling class. That the court was the
center for the administration of justice, or the negotiation of international relationships, or of any substantial business, is simply discounted; that figures
like More or Cromwell or Burghley had more on their minds than self-aggrandizement is never considered; the court's sole concern was, in Whigham's view, the mystification of its own power. This is to take absolutely
literally the rhetoric of court life and thus to be mystified by the texts that
obscured the real business of the court (In Whigham's view, it seems, one
only goes to parties ~o make contacts, or engages in conversations to score
pOints.). The argument, in short, is insular and narrow, and however much it
penetrates the rhetoric of advancement, it cannot sustain the totalization at
which Whigham aims. "Since the symbolic functions we have examined
could use any substantive actions as a vehicle," Whigham concludes-pointing, as he repeatedly does, to the transformation of any substantive into a
symbolic channel of the ambition for privilege, "our field of view might finally extend to encompass all of human action" (p. 184), if, one might add,
all human actions were motivated solely by greed, ambition, envy, and the
like, if the only purpose of power was its own display.
One need not fall back on naive or sentimental views of human motivation
to feel that Whigham's views are excessively narrow and nasty. One might,
for instance, counter Whigham's argument with those of Thomas Greene on
Castiglione or Louis Montrose on Puttenham. In a 1979 essay, "II Cortegiano
and the Choice of a Game," recently collected by Robert Hanning and David
Rosand in Castiglione: The Ideal and the Real in Renaissance Culture (1983),
Greene also sees the tenuousness of court existence, the tensions of a tightrope walk; but, unlike Whigham, he is alive to a full play of social inflections.
Whigham's paradiastolic view claims at best to be alert to duplicities; in fact,
it is a rhetoric that relentlessly sees all surfaces as manipulations and offers
these surfaces as their full substance. That such play might be knowing play,
or that it might be on the margins of power not so encoded, are merely two
of a number of alternatives that Whigham never entertains. His literalism
takes the form of a total distrust; everything must mean something else, and
that something else must be mean-spirited. Although Puttenham's courtly
figure of Allegoria is, predictably, Whigham's refuge for this view, Whigham's Puttenham exists in a "repressive absolutist climate" (p. 186) that
sounds more like Stalin's Russia than Elizabeth's England. Unlike Montrose,
Whigham is not concerned with an exactness of social matrices. He takes the
broad view of a society in transition, and offers his texts (for the most part
Italian and produced for smallscale courts) as a single textbook for the English court, contextless and seamless. iiI propose to homogenize the conceptual materials of courteous practice . .. by arguing that most of the major
texts were formally pliant to incremental use in social debate and self-presentation .... I conceive Renaissance courtesy theory . .. as a corpus of strategies that is coherent as practice even though discontinuous among its
textualizations . .. . We must expect frequent citations out of context ... "
(p. 27). Thus, unlike the new historicists to whom he claims allegiance,
Whigham (unlike Greenblatt or Montrose) is not alive to the particularities of
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social context. His are master tropes without a history. What worked in aristocratic Urbina worked in Elizabethan London.
In fact, the theoretical model for Whigham-as the repeated invocation of
GoHman or Burke indicates-is sociological. Social theory and society are
treated as one and the same-as if Castiglione transcribed scenes of life at
U:rbino that were replayed at the court of Elizabeth, a view that is false on
two counts at least. Occasionally, as in pondering over the list of New Year's
gifts or the sumptuary codes, Whigham does manage a convincing glimpse at
court practice. More often, a sleight of hand accomplishes the move from
texts to court life. Thus, arguing that social difference was mystified as a difference in kind and not merely in degree, Whigham cites "the biological version of this trope, to speak literally of leaping" (p. 71), quoting a text about
miscegenation that he then assumes is applicable to the ambitions of "malapert assheads" (a tag from Castiglione quoted with frequent relish). Or, assigning the name cosmesis to the trope that camouflages vulnerability, he
proceeds to discuss the "class of female whipping boys" (p. 116) lambasted
for the use of makeup. Such doubtful procedures are repeated in these decontextualized readings bent on systematization; transitions creak with the
machinery of totalization. And often the theorization of texts is so weighted
by sociological jargon as to accomplish its own mystifications. Stripping texts
of their highminded pretenses they are then clothed in the seeming highmindedness of sociological abstractions, part of the book's attempt to wear
the mantle of theoretical power and total penetration. There is no sprezzatura
here, however, and the text of Ambition and Privilege can be heavy going indeed, not least for its monological repetitiousness and its jargon, but most in
succeeding all too well in its attempt "to reclaim the banal" (p. 185). As perhaps some of the quotations suggest already, Whigham's style can also be accused of being content, fancy talk obscuring precise analysis. Here, for
instance, is a view of social "convection": "But what should be stressed at
this point is that many of these tactics, or many of their uses, were finally
self-defeating, since they were aimed at making possible one social action (of
the speaker) while refrigerating the frame against further convection by others" (p. 25). Here, for another instance, is a view of social stratification: "The
lamination of these concentric circles and of the interrupted continuum of
noble and ignoble has several strategic effeels" (p. 71).
Yet, despite the pretension of its writing and the narrowness of its views,
Ambition and Privilege offers a partial account that is worth having as a
corrective to the idealizing of courtesy texts, or to their dismissal as subliterary. Whigham is surely correct in demanding that these texts be reclaimed as
an important articulation of Renaissance social theory. They now require
placement in a more fully realized social and historical context; equally, they
need to be seen against other literary depictions of court life. These goals are
announced in Whigham's "Afterword," and one can hope that his next book
will escape the limits of Ambition and Privilege.

Brown University

Jonathan Goldberg
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Love Known: Theology and Experience in George Herbert's Poetry by Richard
Strier. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. xxi +
277. $22.00.
Anyone with a professional interest in George Herbert should read Love
Known. Almost all the poems in "The Church" acquire clarity and purpose as
a result of the reformation context provided here. Strier's readings demonstrate beyond dispute that justification by faith is a definitive assumption,
probably the definitive religious assumption, underlying The Temple. This
"extraordinarily rich and powerful theological doctrine," Strier explains,
"means to transform the religious consciousness .... It demands a central
and commanding role; all other doctrines and positions must derive their energy from it" (p. xii). For an explanation of the doctrine, Strier relies primarily on Luther, not only because "Anyone who emphasizes justification by
faith with theological clarity and lyrical intensity will sound like Luther"
(p. xiii), but also because "Herbert's position is Luther's-that is the sum and
substance of my argument" (p. xiv). Again and again Strier's readings show
that Herbert's poetry was-like his faith-more personal, more experiential,
more emotional, more inward, more unpredictable, than it once seemed.
Strier's style is graciously irenic, and his argument gathers its force from
links between the poetry and the theology, not from disagreements with
other critics. Nonetheless, his reformation view of The Temple is the culmination of a major revolution in Herbert studies. From the mid seventeenth century when Izaak Walton wrote the Life of Herbert until very recently, most
readers have assumed George Herbert was a high Anglican, committed to the
order and beauty of a ceremonious orthodoxy, and indebted (as Tuve and
Martz argued) to conventional Catholic poetry and meditation. After reading
Love Known, and discovering Herbert's commitment to the inward and spiritual faith of the early reformers and their more radical followers, one can no
longer take Herbert's "high Anglicanism" for granted. Indeed, the very term
is an anachronism.
Strier is immensely erudite-the bibliography alone will be a great resource for future scholars of seventeenth-century religious literature. Yet Love
Known is not dominated by scholarly documentation. Each chapter begins
with one facet of the central thesis-explained in two or three pages. The
body of the chapter applies the doctrine to a substantial group of poems.
Strier has admirably decided to analyse whole poems and to avoid selective
quotation; that makes his particular readings truly probing and his larger
conclusions deservedly authoritative. Once in a while Strier sounds dismissive, but even if '''The Discharge' does not constitute a theologically relevant
piece" (p. 115), Strier provides impressively detailed and thorough analyses
of about 130 of Herbert's 164 poems.
Although the issues are highly complex and the sources often opaque,
Strier explains justification by faith and a host of related beliefs lucidly and
concisely. We learn, for example: "Grace alone made salvation possible ..
Man could not claim for himself ever so little without claiming too much"
(p. 2); "a Christian man is both righteous and a sinner [simul justus et
peccator] (p. 16); "Nothing in man is free of sin" (p. 29); "the intellect profanes religion" (p. 44); "Faith and reason are inimical and directly opposed"
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(p. 46); "Man is saved by ceasing from (intellectual) effort, which can only
damn him" (p. 47); "Human insufficiency was only half of it. What made the
gospel truly good news was the other half; the doctrine of grace" (p. 66);
lithe doctrine of the irresistibility of grace" is "easily misrepresented. It seems
to involve a violation of the human personality a conception of God as an
impersonal force .... But Herbert always conceived of God as a figure with
whom genuine relationship was possible, a true 'thou.'" (pp. 82-83). With
the majority of Herbert's poems these basic assumptions of the reformation
prove enormously clarifying. Realizing, for example, that Herbert rejects all
efforts to merit God's grace helps explain why so many of Herbert's poems
end on a note of joyous submission; although to us transcendence of the self
and dependence on God might seem like a stymied defeat, for Herbert they
are a triumphant discovery of loving faith.
In order not to burden the poems with theology, Strier relegates the fine
points and much of the documentation to footnotes. Most readers will be
grateful that Strier keeps his eye closely focused on the poems, but at times I
could not help wishing for more explanation and less notation. For example,
in discussing the "motives involved in the creation of elaborate art/' Strier
says, "Calvin's remarks on the connections between pride and 'love of strife'
are perhaps relevant here" (p. 180). But instead of explaining Calvin's position and determining whether or not it is relevant, the footnote simply refers
us to the InstitutesIILvii.4. "Ultimately, my commitment is to the illumination of the poetry" (p. xi), Strier explains, which is, of course, what it should be.
Some potential readers may be discouraged by Strier's theological focus,
but they should not be, for the greatest attraction of this book is that it makes
Herbert's poems so appealingly human. Luther's attack 'on reason and his
emphasis on "the special status of emotion in the relationship between man
and God" (p. 174) yield poetry that is less abstractly intellectual or rational
and more personat more experiential, above all, more full of feeling. Confronted with the abstract language that begins "The Bunch of Grapes" -"Joy,
I did lock thee up: but some bad man/Hath let thee out again" -Strier observes that the speaker "addresses this abstraction in a comically exasperated
tone, as if it were a wayward child or stray cat" (p. 155). A stray cat-that's
wonderfuL For the reformation divines, faith is inseparable from experience.
Even at the moment when reason yields to faith, and the speaker yields to
God, Strier describes the change as a heart-felt human experience. He sees
the end of "The Collar," for example, not as a requisite and disappointing
capitulation to piety but as a "spontaneous" response to love: "This spontaneity is the true vision of freedom in the poem" (p. 277). For Herbert (as
Strier shows) even sin is a familiar feeling in the gut: "The speaker's soul
draws back in 'Love' (III) merely and precisely because he is human-and
therefore conscious of being so, and therefore 'guiltie'" (p. 74). Because Strier
believes "what God demands from the regenerate is not seemliness but sincerity" (p. 177), he also stresses the irreverence of Herbert's language. Thus
when we find Herbert "expressing what could legitimately be called humility," Strier looks beneath the surface piety, and concludes that "Herbert has
a strong sense of the arrogance implicit in this humility" (p. 80).
Strier is at his very best when describing the complex emotional coloring of
Herbert's poems. He tells us, for example, that the opening of "Assurance" is
I
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"exclamatory, almost sputtering, as if Herbert were trying to banish the
thought by execrating it, calling it names." Elsewhere he calls our attention
to "the note of cavilling" (p. 77), the "comic vigour" (p. 68) the "geniality of
the speaker's self mockery" (p. 67). Probably because he understands the religious issues so fully, Strier can say with confidence when something is a
"simple, sober, and impressive assertion" (p. 89) and when it is "a joke"
(p. 167); when "the lines are so obviously sophistical as to be playful" (p.
94), when the "geniality of the speaker's self-mockery leaves no doubt about
the happy ending" (p. 67), and when Herbert is speaking "feelingly and seriously, like a man that is past jest" (p. 176). Although one might think that so
much comedy would undermine Herbert's religious purpose, one of Strier's
main goals is to demonstrate just how light-hearted and joyous early seventeenth-century protestantism was; thus he reminds us, "the significance of
these lines .. , . is in their gaiety and wit, their attitudinal rather than their
conceptual content" (p. 113). Indeed Strier provides perhaps the richest account yet of the interplay between sincerity and humor in "The Church."
Nor is Strier deaf to the wide variety of poetic and rhetorical effects in "The
Church": he notes when "the singsong of the meter reinforces the smug and
proverbial effect, as does the ostentatiously balanced construction" (p. 98).
Strier's fine sense of tone and wit prove that "The more deeply we understand the theology of the poetry, the more deeply we understand its human
content. The two are one" (p. xxi). That finally is what Strier claims and
demonstrates most feelingly, and it explains why so many early seventeenthcentury religious poets wrote not simply great religious poems but great
poems.
Strier's argument suggests, although he is too tactful to say so directly, that
one must understand the religious context in order to explain Herbert's
poems: "A purely 'internal' reading of the poems can show that they have
certain shapes or emphases but cannot show why. The poems can be explicated without truly being rendered intelligible" (p. xi). Even when we set out
to discuss Herbert's poetry "as poetry," Strier shows that we are always
making assumptions, however inadvertently, about Herbert's beliefs. Thus
where critics operating under modernist assumptions (including modern religious assumptions) see weakness, Strier, applying the doctrine of justification, finds religious strength. Where critics have found religious piety or
psychological strength, Strier sees misguided efforts to merit God's grace.
Where they see narrative collapse and a loss of ego, Strier discovers spiritual
progress and a much sought for transcendence of the self.
Love Known is bound to meet some resistance because it insists on the religious context. If one has been reading Herbert for years, one might not want
to hear that the morass of Reformation theology has suddenly become required reading. It is not simply that the literature of religious controversy is
difficult to read, or even read about; Luther and Calvin are not much less accessible than Pindar, and few of us, regardless of critical methodology, would
dismiss a classical scholar who highlights and explains previously overlooked
or misunderstood details in Renaissance odes. But when the field of inquiry
changes from the classical literature of Greece and Rome to the controversial
literature of the Reformation, and a critic like Strier suggests that Herbert includes this or that puzzling detail not because literary convention required it,
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but because his God required it, proffered scholarly information can easily
seem, not illuminating, but "extrinsic" or unwelcome. Even today, most critics of The Temple operate under strong beliefs. Anglicans and Roman Catholics who cherish the beauty of a ceremonious orthodoxy may dislike the low
"Church" Strier offers instead. Atheists, agnostics, and deconstructionists
who cherish doubt and provisionality may also dislike the doctrinal clarifications Strier provides, though for very different reasons. To benefit from Love
Known one must be willing to accept the religious context of the reformation,
not as the final explanation of Herbert's poetry, nor the end of literary pluralism, but as one crucial key to interpretation.
Since, as Strier acknowledges, the "readings provide the primary (though
not exclusive) evidence for the theses, while the theses guide the readings"
(p. xi), critics will undoubtedly question both the readings and the theses, or
at least some of them, as I would. But rather than arguing over poems, for
other readers would surely question my interpretations in turn, I would
rather suggest some ways in which Strier might have buttressed his argument, or used his basic premises to reach somewhat different conclusions.
First of all, Strier's argument must rest on his readings because he does not
have any substantial, extrinsic evidence of Herbert's beliefs. Compelling evidence of Herbert's concern with the justification by faith can be found, however, by applying Herbert's notes and letter about Valdesso's Considerations
to the Considerations itself. Strier's extensive bibliography omits the Considerations, although like Love Known, it is devoted to the question of justification
by faith. In chapters 1-5 Strier turns to Luther and his early Reformation followers (including Calvin, but only when he echoes Luther.) Strier then turns
in chapters 6-8 to more radical Puritans whose writings often appeared after
Herbert's death and who emphasized the inwardness and spirituality that
Strier finds in Herbert's poetry. I think these less successful final chapters
would have been stronger if Strier had consulted not the radicals but Calvin,
because as Barbara Lewalski correctly asserts, and Strier acknowledges, Herbert, like most members of the British Church, was a "Calvinist in theology"
(Protestant Poetics, p. 286).
Though extremely illuminating, Strier's Lutheran model does not fully explain some important aspects of Herbert's poetry and belief, not only matters
like Herbert's sacramentalism which Strier describes as Calvinist and consciously omits, but also the very doctrines that Strier emphasizes: regeneration, the Holy Spirit, Revelation, and reason. While Strier separates these
issues, Calvin offers a simple paradigm which connects them in time; after an
initial experience of faith, regeneration begins, and slowly (though not completely until the Last Judgment) the individual's fallen human reason is corrected by revelation of the Holy Spirit. In chapter 5, "The New Life:
Conversion," Strier describes regeneration as "primarily cognitive and epistemological, an experience of knowing and seeing" (p. 133). Strier himself recognizes that his account of regeneration is unsatisfactorily abstract: "It would
be odd if the poet who found those' demonstrations' most evident and clear
that fetched their proofs 'ev'n from the very bone' should not have left in his
poetry some direct account of his own conversion" (p. 133). Strier finds one
"direct account" of regeneration in "The Glance," which is indeed more
emotional and personal. It is nonetheless a "report" of a long-past event, or
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rather "a credo as a report" (p. 137). Given the great importance that the Reformation (and Strier) places on direct personal experience, one would expect
Herbert to provide more immediate and dramatic accounts of the most personal and crucial of all religious experiences-the errors of natural man, the
transforming experience of regeneration, and the slow process of sanctification. This is, I believe, precisely what Herbert arranged the poems in "The
Church" to dramatize. Strier argues that the speaker is of course a regenerate
Christian throughout, but several poems at the beginning of "The Church"
suggest that the speaker is still unregenerate. Strier argues that the speaker's
complaints about his hard heart are themselves a sign of grace, but they
could also be a preparation for grace, as Norman Pettit explains in The Heart
Prepared. I believe that many of the opening poems like "Nature," in which
the speaker explicitly begs God to make him "new," are designed to show
that the speaker is not yet reborn. In fact, Strier provides (without recognizing) compelling evidence that at the outset of "The Church" the speaker is
chosen but not reborn; an extraordinary number of the poems which Strier
cites to illustrate the speaker's fallen reason and misdirected efforts to merit
grace occur at the beginnning of "The Church." It is not until the poem entitled "Faith" that the speaker has his first revelation of regenerate reason:
"Faith did change the scene: / And then appear'd a glorious skie." In the
next poem, "Repentance," the transforming experience of faith leads-as reformation doctrine and Strier both say it should-to the first real experience
of repentance in "The Church."
Indeed, there is a much tighter connection between "2. The Attack on Reason," "B. The Limits of Experience," and "5. The New Life" than Strier explains. The separation of these issues produces what is probably the major
omission in Strier's overall argument: the order of poems in "The Church."
When it suits his purpose, Strier ties his readings of individual poems to the
immediate context, but he ignores the organization of "The Church" as a
whole because his goal is to explain-but not to trace the development ofHerbert's faith. Consequently, he devotes much of his attention to the "series
of powerful and theologically explicit poems written after the compilation of
the 'W' manuscript" (p. 95). Perhaps sensing this lopsidedness, the final
chapter, "The Limits of Experience," considers those "moments of negative
feeling" when "faith relies on the evidence of something not seen or (immediately) felt" (p. 219). This chapter provides an important corrective, but it
neither acknowledges the scope of the problem, nor accounts for the large
number of poems where the speaker, plagued by spiritual doubt, seeking
faith he does not yet have, makes one blunder after another.
Finally I question chapter 6, "The Heart Alone: Inwardness and Individualism," which argues that Herbert, like the radical Puritans, rejected artful language, along with outward ceremony, because he trusted solely in "the
inward testimony of the Spirit." First let me say that Strier makes an absolutely compelling case that "the inward testimony of the Spirit" (p. 144) provides a "historical and religious validation of Herbert's concern with his own
experience" (p. 156). After the opening remarks, however, Strier says little
more about the Spirit in chapter 6, and that is unfortunate because, as Calvin's theology and Lewalski's Protestant poetics explain, a Protestant poet
who believed deeply in the spirit would probably also have believed that oc-
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casionally the spirit inspired his poems. Having demonstrated throughout
that man's effort to worship God in prayer and poem is always imperfect,
Strier concludes in "A true Hymne" that "God's writing Loved has nothing to
do with poetry. Herbert is not in any way claiming that God actually wrote
the final word of his poem" (p. 205). I would argue that Herbert meant this
quite literally: in discovering that "God writeth, Loved," Herbert once again
learns that he can and must rely solely on the Holy Spirit, precisely because
his own love and art are so imperfect. Thanks to the Spirit, inspiration occurs
not only in Herbert's heart but also in his poems, which are often a revelation for the poet as well as the reader.
Some critics may be tempted to dismiss Strier's argument because they disagree with particular poetic or doctrinal interpretations. That would be a
great mistake, and a great loss. I have also disagreed with some aspects of
Strier's argument but only to further the debate he begins so soundly, not to
question the basic premises of Love Known. Strier has proven beyond a doubt
that Herbert's poetry is imbued with and greatly illuminated by the Reformation doctrine of justification by faith alone. If we are tempted to construe
either Herbert's poems or Reformation doctrines somewhat differently, that
simply shows that The Temple captures the spirit of the Reformation-for, we
must remember, theology and worship were more hotly contested and
widely debated during the Reformation than literary theory is today. Clarifying Herbert's Reformation sympathies, and recognizing his commitment to
the direct personal experience of faith, is the beginning not the end of interpretation. Strier's gracious concluding words serve as a model for us all: "I
have tried to do some 'nailing down' in this study, but I hope I have provided a floor or a road rather than a wall" (p. 245). Thanks to Love Known
the road is now much more clearly marked; the twists and turns remain to
challenge future scholars, who will undoubtedly argue for years to corne over
details-of faith and language.

Williams College

Ilona Bell

The Sacred Complex: On the Psychogenesis of "Paradise Lost" by William Kerrigan. Cambridge, Massachsetts and London, England: Harvard University
Press, 1983. Pp. x + 344. $25.00.
A book subtitled On the Psychogenesis of "Paradise Lost" courts in advance
something like Andrew Marvell's apprehension lest Milton himself might
"ruin ... jThe sacred Truths to Fable and old Song." But not, it turns out, to
worry: there are no ruinous reductions here. Informed by remarkable intelligence and breadth of learning, William Kerrigan's study could, in fact, be
characterized as an attack on the reductiveness of most literary criticism, traditional and modern.
In Kerrigan's view, traditional historical criticism shares with psychoanalytic criticism the impulse to force great texts into narrow structures of meaning
-in the first instance the commonplaces of an historical era and, in the second, the archaic patterns of an author's (or reader's) mind. But psychoanaly-
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sis, he maintains, offers an opportunity not available elsewhere, an
opportunity to break free from closed systems of interpretation. With Paul
Ricoeur as a principle guide and inspiration, Kerrigan wishes to avoid a psychoanalytic discourse restricted to a concern with the text as fantasy-a concern which, like historical criticism, confines meaning to a past. Rather, by
respecting "the cultural life of symbols" he would "generate a narrative of
the creative act oriented toward its 'second life' as a source of our pleasure
and our wisdom." He wishes (in Ricoeur's terms) "to capture meaning in its
flight from 'the space of fantasy' to the 'space of culture'" (p. 4).
More specifically, Kerrigan finds in the symbolism of "Miltonic Christianity" an occasion to reconsider psychoanalytic theory, the principles of which
have not, in his view, been adequately "thematized" (p. 5). It is the theory of
the superego which Kerrigan places centrally at risk by submitting it "to the
intelligence and sublimity of Milton's faith" (p. 6)-a faith expressed in a
theology and art fundamentally oedipal in character: "I would like to recover
something of the original urgency of the encounter between religion and psychoanalysis. If psychoanalysis would guard us against the primitive illusions
of religion, perhaps religious affirmations of the superego would guard us
against the civilized [post-Freudian] illusions of a self-authenticating ego"
(pp. 7-8). One could question the fortuitousness of Kerrigan's discovery, in
his subject, a corrective to the deficiencies of his method, but what in fact
emerges from the speculative "encounter" he undertakes is exciting enough
to justify far less secure procedures. A psychoanalytic study of Milton is right
for our moment, and we are fortunate to have had Kerrigan to undertake it.
At the center of Kerrigan's presentation of Milton's achievement-psychological and artistic-and at the center of his revised sense of the superego is
the idea of the sacred complex, a reinactment of "the oedipus complex in the
sphere of religion" (p. 77) which is different from the repetitions which make
the "religious element in some lives ... [appear] to be reducible without
much leftover to early psychic arrangements" (p. 73). The sense of God
achieved in this "mature fulfillment of the complex" (p. 73) is not fixed, not
based on repetition. The God of the sacred complex has not become equivalent to the demands of the prevailing culture. Rather, this is a more primitive
God, a God recovered from an original search:
... if the searching child has attached the Name-of-God, with a reverence indistinct from fear and trembling, to the father at the threshold of
the superego, an unpredictable figure of pure power whose authority
stands prior to any apprehension of law as such, religious devotion
may permit a creative "immaturing" of the fallen superego [the superego become vehicle of culture]. One may regain through such a voluntarist God eccentric possibilities obscured by the evolution of the
superego, and if society is to some degree tolerant of these possibilities,
a dimension of the indefinite, of radical futurity, may appear in the cultural order. (p. 77)
In Kerrigan's reading of Milton's works, the perfected hero of this sacred superego is the Christ of Paradise Regained (a psychological portrait of the
mature Milton) whose extraordinary strength and ability await, unmoved;
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"eccentric possibility" derives from his absolute submission to a "voluntarist
God" who liberates the sacred hero from the satanically voiced demands of a
culture opposed to "radical futurity."
In the psychobiography Kerrigan presents, Paradise Regained stands last. In
the design of his study, it is paired at the outset with Comus to suggest the
psychological distance Milton traversed from a young manhood in which virginity was "the intimate core of ... [his] poetic identity" (p. 53) to a wholly
transformed maturity. Having established these termini-the tempted lady
and the tempted Christ-Kerrigan turns to Paradise Lost, his principle concern and, for him, the occasion of Milton's great self-transformation. "How
did he do it?" is Kerrigan's initial question, and, with the idea of the sacred
complex as context, blindness is the fundamental answer. Blindness was Milton enabling circumstance, a sign in need of meaning and a meaning in
need of interpretation, both of which Milton created by first submitting to the
significance of this sign already created in his unconscious" (p. 135).
Kerrigan approaches this significance in complicated ways which do not
lend themselves easily to brief summary. An extended discussion of first creation (Milton's "first born ... unapproached Light") leads to a consideration
of origins as they appear in the "Freudian melodrama" of the primal scenethe scene of which Milton is, Kerrigan rightly maintains, "the poet" (p. 162).
As the act of seeing, in this "space of sexual desire," is associated with guilt,
blindness ultimately becomes an enabling prior punishment for the poet who
seeks to "see and tell / Of things invisible to mortal sight," to witness his
and our first parents "Imparadis't in one another's arms." Milton's account
was settled: "he had paid the penalty [for the ambition of his epic] before
commiting the crime" (p. 190). As a real circumstance, blindness was also
enabling in forcing in Milton a psychological regression, the creative "immaturing" Kerrigan posits as a component of the sacred complex. Creating a
child-like dependency on the ministrations of others, "blindness gave him a
new claim on the image of the early mother; he found the evidence of her
presence in dreams [the nightly visitations of a feminine muse] that permitted
him to see and to wander, becoming strong in the weakness of the child" (p.
190). As castration, blindness produces in Milton not only a sense of debt repayed but also the feminine receptivity of the "darkling" bird who "Tunes
her noctural Note" (it is Satan who expells the woman in himself); and apposite to the emergence of the feminine, it is blindness which creates the
void, the "Universal blanc," that Paradise Lost must fill. Detached from the
richness of Kerrigan's full argument, such observations may seem very vulnerable, perhaps offensive. As they appear, however, in the context of a passionate engagement with Milton's poetry, they offer, at worst, an exciting
challenge to our view of Milton and our conceptions of the creative process.
Kerrigan's sense of Milton's achievement faces a crisis in his final chapter
on Paradise Lost. Here he presents a version of the dissatisfaction many have
felt with the last two books of the epic. Prior to these books, Kerrigar. has
found consistent evidence of psychological advancement, of a religious synthesis which both expresses Milton's psychic history and frees him from mechanistic repetitions of this past. Such a liberating synthesis should, to his
mind, confer a sense of positive value on the ways of men, but in the final
book of Milton's epic an oppressively negative view of human history as the
f/
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stage of futile repetition throws the weight of Milton's argument for God's
justice on a blissful, apocalyptic end-a religious disposition Kerrigan characterizes as "another of the poisons that taint this life" (p. 280). This failure on
Milton's part, this temporary inability to do more than "idolize" the first paradise by binding oneself to the desire for its return, is at last, Kerrigan thinks,
overcome: "To prevent the third paradise [heaven] from becoming a defensive idol, our mortal state in the second paradise [the promised "paradise
within"] must be chosen without reference to the happy end" (p. 285). And
so, in Kerrigan's reading of the epic's "uncanny" final lines, it is. Unlike Satan, "bound absolutely to a trauma in the past" (p. 288), fallen Adam and
Eve create, by choosing the interior paradise, "an expiatory symbol" (p. 284)
which is authentic and liberating:
Authentic symbols begin in undenied catastrophe, making absence
present not that desire may be bound to an indestructible wish, but
that desire may be rerouted from an indestructible loss. The physical
action at the end of Paradise Lost-turning back, weeping, then turning
around to find another place in slow steps betraying the effort of detachment-represents, with tremendous force and brevity, the difficult
acquisition of a good symbol. Gaining a space of indeterminancy in
which "more" might flourish, the paradise within is being pried loose
from its original referent. (p. 296).
Kerrigan's eloquent remarks on Milton's final lines (in which we see "our
parents as our equals" and "man is all in all" [pp. 296-297]) serve admirably
to persuade us that Milton's finale rescues his poem from its depressed descent into fallen history. But how close Milton has come, in this account, to
substituting "the bliss of the eschaton" (p. 297) for a life-giving symbol; how
precarious, indeed, and hopeful are Kerrigan's claims for Milton's psychological achievement. Freedom is what the sacred complex promises, a future
which is more than a repetition of the past. Yet the idea of a freedom based
on submission to a psychological "other," a God of indeterminate ways,
seems an illusion which does not speak clearly to our future and remained,
even for Milton, a fragile pOSSibility. From a Christian point of view, moreover, the God of this sacred dispensation, creating life's contingencies by
withholding and then, perhaps, supplying sudden "motions" in the faithful,
seems dangerously close to having repented of the gift of rational choice.
Reason is not primary in Kerrigan's assessment of Milton's virtues, and it is
here, apart from objections to his psychoanalytic approach, that his views
will find resistance. As in his first book, it is Milton as prophet that Kerrigan
values, and in this his second study the emphasis throughout is on the open
and intuitive perception over the dead letter of rational discourse, PseudoDionysius not Augustine, symbol not idol. He willingly acknowledges a
strong rational element in Milton (Paradise Regained in an admittedly discursive poem; The Christian Doctrine is hardly the work of a Pseudo-Dionysius), but his devaluation of this aspect of Milton's intellectual make-up
comes close to suppression.
Kerrigan's is and will remain not everyone's Milton. He clearly seeks in
Milton what he values in life; his book passionately, personally pursues an
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open Umeditation" on the symbols he believes to shape our lives and literature. As the "blanc" of blindness enabled his author, the inexhaustibility of
the "symbol" enables Kerrigan to pursue meaning beyond the limits of what
some readers will easily tolerate. But if the unflagging intensity of Kerrigan's
discourse can be wearisome or grating, it is often genuinely moving, as in his
final pages on the close of Milton's epic. Kerrigan's purpose exceeds the normal limits of literary criticism and deserves a patience which might not be extended elsewhere. I cannot assess his contribution to psychoanalytic theory,
but I can value his response to Milton and his clear intention to write a testament of hope for humanity.

Boston University

William G. Riggs

Realism, Myth, and History in Defoe'S Fiction by Maximillian E. Novak. lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 181. $17.95.
Defoe and the Idea of Fiction,. 1713-1719 by Geoffrey M. Sill. Newark: University of Delaware Press; London and Toronto: Associated University Presses,
1983. Pp. 190. $22.00.
Defoe has travelled a long way as a canonical author in the last twentyfive years or so, and much of the impetus for that trip has come from Maximillian Novak. By now the dean of American Defoe scholars, Novak has
helped shift the center of activity on Defoe from source study and biography
to literary criticism that conceives of Defoe not as the agile hack who somehow scribbled one or two books everybody still reads but as one "of the
great writers of his time" (p. xiii), the possessor of a richly stocked mind and
a specifically focused literary talent. Such revision has gained wide acceptance, and Realism, Myth, and History in Defoe'S Fiction gathers five of Novak's essays from the last fifteen years that argue convincingly for Defoe's
"often-underestimated complexities" (p. xiii) of style and language and that
seek to establish Defoe as a superbly self-conscious narrative artist who is
much more than the proto-realistic, instinctively gifted mimic who imagined
various memorable characters with unprecedented psycho-social richness. Instead, Novak's Defoe is a thinker, "perhaps the most versatile and prolific
creator of systems in his age" (p. 13), and his narratives were produced by an
imagination that "fused the events of history with the materials of fantasy
into a unique type of fiction" (p. xiv).
Inevitably, unity or continuity in collected essays like these is imposed or
at least discovered after the fact. Novak's preface and introduction, from
which I've been quoting, make only modest claims in those directions, as he
admits that his book is singleminded in its exploration of Defoe's "fictive
imagination" (p. xiv) rather than unified by a methodology. But Novak's
book is in fact unified by his densely contextualized knowledge of Defoe.
These essays are immensely informative annotations of some of Defoe's narratives, to some extent a guide to their complicated social and historical contexts, but primarily to their origins in Defoe's intellectual and artistic
biography.
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Like all commentators on Defoe's narratives, Novak wrestles with the
problem of classification. Just what shall we call books like Robinson Crusoe,
Moll Flanders, and Memoirs of a Cavalier? For narratives like these, Novak refines the anachronistic label of novel and expands what he sees as the restrictive achievement of realism. In what may be too cavalier a critical gesture,
Novak seems to dismiss Defoe's documentary realism as simply a local device, subordinate to a larger vision that aspires to historical generality and ultimately to mythic or even archetypal significance. He argues with Ian Watt's
suggestion that Defoe fashioned a new kind of circumstantial realism, missing Watt's delicate, philosophically informed handling of that notion
whereby Defoe's quotidian world is no longer securely pOSitioned in the controlling hierarchies of literary and moral tradition.
What Novak begins as modest reclassification ends as a grand redefinition
of Defoe's narratives. Given what they are not (not properly novels and not
simply realistic), they must be something else that Defoe intended and that
can be recaptured by careful historical reconstruction. Defoe and his age were
abandoning older myths and trying to shape new ones. "The concreteness of
realistic fiction often gave flesh and blood to what might otherwise have
been a highly abstract system of beliefs" (p. 9). This gives the game away.
For Novak, literary form is simply a rhetorical device, after the fact of experience and insight, a means for dramatizing ideas rather than an expressive
participant in their formation. But what he grants Defoe is more than artistic
self-consciousness; it is a sort of powerfully lucid cultural purpose that masters the contradiction between myth and history. Openly in his non-fiction
and implicitly in the fiction, Defoe rehearses the "Whig myth of history," but
(and this is a key turn in Novak's argument) his "art lay in his ability to convey his myths as true history" (p. 15). The paradox Novak asks us to consider as the unifying center of Defoe's fiction is, then, that his characters are
"both highly individualized and mythic, firmly based in history, and capable
of floating free from time" (p. 17).
Novak's preliminary summaries are more persuasive and coherent than the
essays that follow, and his "attempt to explore Defoe's fictive imagination"
turns at times into a rather literal-minded reconstruction, familiar to readers
of popular biographies, of what Defoe must have been thinking at this or
that point in his life. To be sure, Novak knows more about Defoe, I would
guess, than just about anybody, and his speculations about Defoe's motives
carry weight and authority. For example, Novak notes that Defoe's career as
frantically active political journalist commences just when he began writing
memoirs, moral dialogues, and fiction. Few critics have Novak's command of
these parallel activities in Defoe's career, and no one else has thought to remark that Robinson Crusoe originated in Defoe's lIactivities as a propagandist
for colonization" (p. 26), an assertion borne out by a scheme he described in
the Weekly Journal of 7 Feb 1719 for a colony at the mouth of the Orinoco
(where Crusoe was to be shipwrecked, far from Selkirk's Juan Fernandez).
Novak demonstrates with a wealth of detail just how Defoe's involvement as
journalist in the human as well as the political events of the day leaves important traces in Robinson Crusoe, and his creative process is to some extent
on display.
With different degrees of success, Novak's other chapters continue that dis-
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play. But his case for Defoe's self-conscious artistry leads Novak to what I
consider critical exaggerations whereby Moll Flanders becomes an almost
Jamesian exercise in which Defoe "was continually manipulating style to
achieve narrative effects" (p. 91), in which Defoe's controlling authorial distance fosters moral ambiguities as Moll creates fictions about herself within
the fiction itself. This approach works better with Roxana, where Defoe's distance seems more consistent and coherent, and Novak's summary of its qualities is definitive: its "interplay between the individual conscience and the
laws of God, nature, and men creates a psychological and moral complexity
that is unique in early fiction" (p. 120). Novak's most original and stimulating chapter reflects his real strength as a historical scholar. Memoirs of a Cavalier appears, as Novak explains its context, as both history and journalism,
about the religious wars of the seventeenth century but "also about the
threat to religious freedom in Defoe's own England and Europe" (p. 59). Novak precisely shows in this chapter how Defoe seems to have adapted a passage in the Memoirs from his experiences as a spy for Harley in Scotland.
Supported by convincing particulars like this, Novak's point is that Defoe
subordinated history in the Memoirs and in A Journal of the Plague Year to the
several purposes of fiction without cancelling the former, achieving in these
two books genuinely historical fiction.
And yet, when Novak balances these specific obserations with speculations, about Defoe's creative process, the results are to my mind often unconvincing, even at times banal. Noting the many storms in Robinson Crusoe
(and also Defoe's book on the great storm of 1703), Novak sees an anticipation of later sensibility: "Like many painters of the second half of the eighteenth century (one thinks immediately of Loutherbourg" and early Turner)
and the Gothic novelists, Defoe was intrigued by human distress in the face
of natural disasters" (p. 31). Even if one accepts that (and Defoe's interest in
disaster can just as plausibly be read as fascination with the administrative
problems disorder brings rather than emotional involvement with its moving
and sublime aspect), there is nothing critically useful in it. Such a remark
tells us more about Novak than Defoe. It suggests that Novak has succumbed
to the temptation of imagining his own Defoe, constructing a plausible
enough character and sensibility from his immersion in the writings of Daniel
Defoe, as if the transition from book to author to reader were seamlessly informative, as if historical scholarship could speak with perfect confidence of
an author from his texts. Perhaps Novak has been led to this biographer'S
hubris by his clear irritation with the critical approach to Defoe that speaks of
his "unconscious" or naive artistry. Novak's Defoe is at times almost a solemn parody of the self-conscious novelistic master, brooding like Vico, on
the meaning of history as he writes Memoirs of a Cavalier and A Journal of the
Plague Year, or pondering the dark psychopathology of the human mind as
he writes Roxana, "his most determined effort to look into the heart of a
character" (p. 110). This thoughtful, systematic, and utterly coherent Defoe
seems no more correct, and a good deal less interesting, than the harried
journalist, writing fiction on nerve and instinct.
Novak's title contains the secret of his revision of Defoe's literary achievement, in which the larger resonances of myth and history replace the locat
perhaps lucky, effects called realism. But Novak's use of myth is at times su-
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perficial, almost gratuitous. For example, he finds Defoe's style at one point
in Moll Flanders "both concise and repetitious at the same time, a technique
that Levi-Strauss has found to be the essential quality of myth" (p. 91). Such
an invocation of myth suggests unconscious inevitabilities, psycho-cultural
formations that speak through the writer and are in large part defined by cultural rather that personal experience. But what Novak seems to be after in
Defoe is rather more self-conscious and deliberate fabulation, what might be
rendered more accurately as "ideology," culturally derived assumptions
about the world that, in Marxist terms, disguise or evade actual social circumstances. In his sometimes expansive and celebratory essays, however, Novak
seeks the largest psycho-cultural resonances in Defoe's narratives, and his
commitment to Defoe the self-conscious master precludes interest in the deformations of ideology within his fiction.
Geoffrey M. Sill's Defoe and the Idea of Fiction 1713-1719 is much more narrowly focused and specifically concerned with how Defoe carne to integrate
in Robinson Crusoe fictional form with that cluster of moral and political ideas
Novak calls the "Whig myth." Using the recent work of revisionist historians
like j. G. A. Pocock, H. T. Dickinson, and Geoffrey Holmes, Sill provides an
excellent summary of this ideology to show how Defoe deliberately effected
the transition from pamphleteer and propagandist to novelist who made
"ideas inhere in fiction" (p. 25), for whom in Robinson Crusoe anyway "ideology and fiction were related and interdependent forms of knowledge" (p.
25). Drawing on Novak's contention that Defoe developed a working theory
of fiction, Sill carefully traces Defoe's development in various shorter pieces
from the period 1713-1719 of a technique whereby fictional elements are
used not just to illustrate moral and political ideas" (p. 24). That sounds more
complex than it turns out to be as Sill proceeds, for what he means is that
Defoe was learning to dramatize "ideas not as objects, but rather as the subjects of consciousness" (p. 25), to embody ideas in plot and character.
Sill's book is exceedingly detailed about Defoe's political pamphlets in
these years. His effort is (to simplify perhaps unfairly) to find fictional elements in some of them and even to suggest that Defoe's mode of argument
became more and more fictional from 1710 to 1719 because he consistently
failed to persuade through what Sill calls the "normal expository genres of
expression" (p. 47). Sill's meticulous scholarship leads him to an evocation of
Defoe's journalism that is sometimes a distraction from his guiding purpose.
Detailed discussions of the circumstances and effects of various pamphlets
surrounding the Hanoverian succession seem to have as their main point that
Defoe grew disillusioned as his ironies failed. In the long run, there is a disparity between Sill's precise scholarship and the conclusions it allows him to
draw about Defoe's development as a writer. He makes much, for example,
of the Secret History of the White Staff (1714-15), a dramatization of Harley's
fall from power. Admitting that the formal resemblance of this book to fiction
is "slight/' Sill goes on to praise its power as a "real-life tragedy," and to
identify its intended effect "to sicken us, shock us, and alarm us into an appreciation of Harley's service in the queen's interest and into the necessity of
his politics of moderation as the best response to absolutism from both sides"
(p. 89). Such an effect is plausible within the richly detailed context of Defoe's life and times Sill provides, but it doesn't survive past that context. He

Criticism, Vol. XXVII, no. 4: Book Reviews

417

can hardly prove that it had any such effect on Defoe's audience, and his
critical evocation of it leaves it dead on the page, of interest only to the historian. It is difficult to accept Sill's characterization of the Secret History of the
White Staff as "ideologically very powerful" when he produces no corresponding narrative power to enforce that ideology. He seems to mean only
that the narrative simplifies events and characters to make an ideological
point.
Sill's problem is that the fictional elements he isolates in Defoe's journalism are of little complexity or formal interest; what he calls the "novelist in
progress" is sharply visible in only a few of his examples (for instance, an insider's account of a meeting between Queen Anne' and a French agent in
Minutes of the Negotiations of Monsr. Mesnager [1717]). And even there, Sill
emphasizes, what really matters are not the vivid, personalized details in the
scene but the "significant ideological message" served by that liveliness, that
the Queen and not just a treacherous faction favored avoiding war with
France over the succession.
In the end, Sill's rigorously informed, minutely circumstantial account of
these works seeks to establish the self-conscious origins of Defoe's career as a
writer of fiction and to make his intentions absolutely central to the meaning
of Robinson Crusoe. Like Novak, Sill is committed to an ideal of historical
scholarship whereby an author's accomplishment is most fully (or even
solely) understood in terms of controlled intentions and self-directed develoment. The real point of combing patiently through Defoe's journalism is to
mark the stages in that development that make Robinson Crusoe not a lucky
improvisation but the culmination of nearly a decade of literary experimentation toward what Sill calls the ideological transformation of history,
Sill's concluding chapter on Robinson Crusoe is, in effect, a reductive political reading whereby the mature Crusoe possesses a specifically political ideology of "moral restraint," Having explored the life of an embodiment of that
principle in his 1718 Memoirs of the Duke of Shrewsbury, Defoe in Sill's rather
schematic account designed Crusoe's story to trace a difficult personal transformation from a compulsion to adventure to that ideal of self-regulation
summed up in cautious politicians like Shrewsbury and Harley, Once again,
the scholarship is impressive, the conclusions drawn from it rather unconvincing, Sill's thesis involves a logical leap: Defoe treated various political issues in the pamphlets he wrote before Robinson Crusoe, and he attempted in
semi-fictional renderings of political events and personalities to dramatize
ideas and embody an ideology of selfless patriotism in heroes like Harley and
Shrewsbury; so therefore the novel was written as "a way of putting his
ideas together into a new moral system that would help to resolve the clash
of men, parties, creeds, and interests" (p. 158). I find this plausible but hardly
proven, useful and perhaps true to Defoe's intentions but partial and even
reductive as a summary of the imaginative heart of Robinson Crusoe.

Rutgers University

John Richetti
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Romantic Contraries: Freedom versus Destiny by Peter L. Thorslev, Jr. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. ix + 225. $21.50.
The dust jacket dubs Professor Thorslev's book "magisteria!," a term that
tends to impress both positively and negatively, imbued as it is with connotations not just of the authoritative but also of the dictatorial. Happily, the
comprehensive sweep of this excellent book is not accompanied by any attendant narrowness of vision. Indeed, the study is refreshingly free of the
sort of portentous pronouncements that undermine so many discussions of
the history of ideas. This is indeed a powerful study, and its power is
strengthened, its credibility increased, by the careful and reasoned diplomacy
with which the author approaches his ambitious task here. One of the most
engaging features of Thorslev's book, in fact, is its tone: the author is generous with his praise of his predecessors, meticulously fair when he finds fault
with their work, and understanding of the complexities that lead writersand their critics-to occasional missteps. Furthermore, he knows when to
take the properly ironic stance of self-caution-a stance, we discover, that
figures very largely in the final section of the book, as a model of one Romantic response to an "open" universe of unconditioned freedom. Thus the
author anticipates our difficulties with his subject matter, helping us maintain
our intellectual equilibrium with reassuring acknowledgements of our predicament ("Somehow, however, about this point the critical mind is apt to balk:
the road becomes too slippery for confident footing" -po 69). The effect of
such comments is reassuring, for in a work as highly compressed as this one,
it is good to know the author is aware both of his demands upon us and of
our likely questions and objections.
In brief, Thorslev poses what is typically accounted a quintessential Romantic problem, the apparent conflict between individual freedom and
collective destiny. Stated thus, the problem implies the concept of dialectic
and carries with it the skeptical framework the Romantics inherited from
their Enlightenment predecessors. Thorslev's is a study of terminology and
its implications for our understanding of the Romantics. He announces early
on, "I have no new solutions to propose, only some clarification of terms" (p.
6). And yet, as the book amply demonstrates, it is precisely such a clarification of terms we most require if we are to return to the concepts of freedom
and destiny the sense in which the Romantics understood those concepts.
Nowhere is the value of such a clarification more startlingly apparent than in
Thorslev's concise rescue of the crusty William Godwin from the bog of misunderstanding in which he has been mired for the better part of two centuries. Thorslev presents us with the Godwin known by Shelley and his
contemporaries, the ethical optimist (not, as is usually assumed, the rationalist, mechanist materialist) whose famous "five propositions" .of irresistible
reason (from Political Justice) are the philosophical cornerstone for a theory
of human perfectibility founded upon a thoroughly examined life, a life of informed choices rather than blind habit, a moral and ethical existence in and
of the conscious mind. By directing us to a reconsideration of Godwin's inherited terminology (and its requisite freight of connotation and convention),
Thorslev effectively illustrates the value of the clarification he everywhere
advocates.
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But Godwin is merely a single example of the larger pattern of clarification
that governs this study. More important are the reconsideration of the central
concepts, freedom and destiny, the world views implicit in them, and the
three key alternatives among which the Romantic tended to choose in formulating their responses to these concepts. Thorslev reminds us that while for
the Romantic freedom is "a prerequisite for moral responsibility, and therefore for a sense of self," it is also highly separative. Destiny, on the other
hand, "is social and collective; it gives man a sense of shared purpose and
mission" (p. 16). Perfect freedom, however, easily verges into total isolation,
a radical rupture of natural relations with one's own species, and the most
perfectly realized stage of individuality thus becomes the most irreversible alienation.
Particularly intriguing in Thorslev's book is his contention that for the Romantics the problem of individual (or even collective) identity stems more
from a threat to one's sense of destiny-of community-than from any threat
to one's sense of freedom. Put another way, we might say the threat lies in
the possibility that, contrary to Wordsworth's claim in "The Old Cumberland
Beggar," we may not "have all of us one human heart." If the inherent impulse of the "natural order of things" is in fact toward entropy and disarray
("things fall apart") rather than toward cohesion and coherence, then perfect
freedom must ultimately lie in a Promethean self-reliance (the "concentered
recompense" of Byron's "Prometheus") and personal definition of freedom
which is humanly relative and cosmologically indifferent, Thorslev argues.
Hence he considers the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various Enlightenment cosmographies and theodicies that inform their Romantic descendants. Principal among these are the atomistic and empirical ("billiard
ball") and the mathematical and rationalistic ("clockwork") models, which
begin with a similar mechanistic premise but proceed to quite different views
of "destiny." The former suggests a world of pure randomness (as in Hardy's
"Hap")-a universe of unpredetermined "accidents"-while the latter suggests a fully destined universe, teleologically arranged and characterized by a
(perhaps unknowable) design.
The conflicting models of experience Thorslev traces to these world-views,
and to the theodicies that seek to account for the relative presence (or absence) in them of an immanent or transcendent heavenly Designer, constitute
the basis for the three alternative models of response the author attributes
both to the European Romantics and-to a considerable extent-to their immediate predecessors in the Enlightenment. The organic universe-the postKantian and Coleridgean model-frees humanity from the necessitarian
burden of a world of mechanical and efficient causes and restores a sense of
purposive freedom, of organic self-determination. Within such a model, the
individual gains a sense of both personal significance and collective (or community) identity from her or his part in the grand cosmic plan of integrated
development that informs the entire natural universe. Here the clearest philosophical revelation (or discovery) consists in the recognition of one's uniqueyet-shared status within the total scheme of things: part and whole are
mutually reflecting, mutually defining. For the organicist, Thorslev argues,
excessive self-consciousness (what Blake termed the Selfhood) is the demon
to be cast out, the source of alienation that is eradicated by a retreat into the

420

Criticism, Vol. XXVII, no. 4: Book Reviews

unconscious, the seat of creativity ("The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" is a
paradigm of this dilemma). The ideal state, in the benevolently-designed organic universe, is akin to that of the Eolian harp: one is unconsciously attuned to the breeze of an immanent destiny which provokes the strings to a
music but half its own.
At the other pole is the world-view that is entirely self-conscious, the ironic
view of a totally "open" universe. In this arrangement the individual must
continually adjust to changes she or he cannot predict in order to work out
an individual destiny in the apparent absence of any clear operant design to
the universe. Here the individual becomes a self-conscious performer (Byron's narrator commenting on the form of Don Juan, a natural Romantic descendant of Tristram Shandy). This individual defines her or his terms and
values on the basis of an observed universe; Thorslev cites Candide and Wilhelm Meister as prototypical examples. Like the organic universe, the open
universe is one of process, but of process without the certainly (or even the
likely possibility) of closure, of culmination in any sort of absolute "Truth." It
is a disconcerting universe, of course, for if every assertion is inherently denied, then every thesis has a separate and equal antithesis-a perfectly balanced skeptical, dialectical tension. This state suggests that of the perpetual
"Mental Fight" that inheres in Blake's doctrine of Contraries, a world in
which all responsibility is placed, ultimately, upon the purely individual
choices made by each actor in the piece. Irony is virtually an instinctive attitude in any such scheme, for it provides us with a measure of self-protection
in the guise of ambiguity and ambivalence. Taken to it extreme, Thorslev
contends toward the end of his book, this view leads to aestheticism and Pater's "hard, gem-like flame." And though he discounts him, Thorslev might
in fact have emphasized Oscar Wilde (as well as his Algernon and Dorian) as
the logical extension of such a view-a life in and of conscious performance.
Lying between these poles, figuratively at least, is the Gothic universe, an
essentially absurd (and absurdist) universe in which inexplicable, capricious,
and generally malevolent forces regularly exercise their sheer, brute power in
disrupting any apparent design (if there is one at all), and to which the only
reasonable response is therefore a Promethean defiance of the inscrutable
destiny that frustrates humanity'S freedom. If the organic view suggests one
should seek to "attune" to an encompassing natural order of things, and if
the open or ironic view suggests one should seek to assess and manipulate
the perceived order, the Gothic view holds that one ought simply to defy that
order. This is Bryon's Prometheus, of course, not Shelley'S, and the Gothic
view leads in the direction, finally, of the grotesque rather than the sublime.
In working out the framework of these alternatives, Thorslev demonstrates
his comprehensive mastery not just of literary and cultural history but also of
philosophy and the history of ideas. Intellectually acute and methodologically sound, Romantic Contraries is a work that seems certain to have an effect on subsequent Romantic (and post-Enlightenment generally) scholarship.
While modestly suggesting that he will essentially help us "clean up and
clarify our thinking on a few matters," Thorslev takes us with him on a
stimulating and rewarding expedition of re-discovery and re-definition. To be
at once learned and engaging is no mean accomplishment, and yet it is this
felicitous combination, together with the deft handling of prodigious scholar-
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ship, that distinguishes Thorslev's book. It is, indeed, in the most positive
sense of the word, a magisterial work.

University of Nebraska

Stephen C. Behrendt

Robert Browning: His Poetry and Audiences by Lee Erickson. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984. Pp. 287. $25.00.
The main thesis of this book can be stated quite simply. Browning imagined an ideal audience that was intimate and capable of returning the artist's
offered sympathy. In actuality, the one earthly audience for Browning was
Elizabeth, and, beyond her, God. In his early poetry, Browning had not discovered an appropriate poetic mode for addressing an audience but preferred
to think that addressing an immediate audience was unnecessary. The successes of Men and Women, however, reflect his discovery of an appropriate
audience in Elizabeth. After her death, Browning became more and more
self-indulgent, supposing that no audience really matters except God.
That is the simple scheme. In practice, the subject is more complicated because Erickson deals with two categories of audiences-those who read
Browning's poems and for whom he wrote them, and audiences within the
poems. The satisfactory perception of many of Browning's poems, especially
the important monologues, depends upon how we understand the relationship between the speakers of these poems and their audiences. Very early in
his study, Erickson opposes one traditional view of Browning's monologues,
asserting that "Browning's poems do not begin with a self-sufficient ego that
through its perception and expression orders and shapes experience, but instead with a speaker who is seeking form and a sense of self in the world"
(p. 17). Thus, for example, in the dramatic monologues of Men and Women,
which Erickson sees as the apex of his achievement, Browning shows how
their audiences help the speakers create images of themselves. Later poems
generally lack audiences that serve this function, a lack that is the source of
their weakness.
Some non-dramatic lyrics also reveal the significance of audience in
Browning's view of poetry. Using "Memorabilia," for which Shelley is supposedly the proper audience, Erickson concludes that the poetic problem for
Browning is lithe creation of a self-conscious identity in the moment of recognizing the divine in the audience to whom one is speaking" (p. 145). The
irony here is that whereas Browning recognized the force of audience within
his poems, he seemed to resist that force in his own work, almost consciously
resisting the kind of implied reader that Iser has made so familiar to literary
critics. According to Erickson's thesis (and it is a convincing one on the
whole), until he found Elizabeth, Browning disliked the notion of being
shaped or understood by an essentially alien audience.
For clarity's sake, Erickson establishes a scheme according to which audiences in Browning's poems are present or absent, single or multitudinous; he
draws conclusions about Browning's values as they are revealed in these audience types. Crowds, for example, are negative audiences, sometimes even
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ominous, as in the witnessing shades of "Childe Roland to the Dark Tower
Came." This scheme is not always rewarding, but then Erickson's purpose is
less the categorizing of audiences than the illuminating of Browning's expectations about his own creative effort. He is successful in this purpose, though
he could have achieved it more concisely. As it is, the main thesis of his book
is repeated too often, whereas the readings of individual poems, though always interesting, often depart significantly from the main thread of the argument. Nonetheless, this study, which by its title might have suggested the
kind of loose social review of Ian Jack's recent The Poet and His Audience or
the thorough surveying of a career exemplified by George Ford's Dickens and
His Readers, offers a fresh method of studying a poet obviously concerned
with the subject of audience and offers a model that might be applied to less
overtly dramatic poets such as Tennyson or Arnold.

Wayne State University

John R. Reed

True Correspondence: A Phenomenology of Thomas Hardy's Novels by Bruce
Johnson. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1983. Pp. 168. $18.00.
The Poetry of Thomas Hardy: A Study in Art and Ideas by William E. Buckler.
New York: New York University Press, 1983. Pp. xii

+ 303. $27.50.

Bruce Johnson and William E. Buckler are riding hard to rescue Thomas
Hardy from imprisonment in the interpretations of others. The passion and
intelligence with which Johnson executes his mission can almost make one
forget the occasional haste with which he cuts off other approaches to Hardy.
William E. Buckler, however, repeatedly stampedes others who have equal
claim to holding the key that will liberate Hardy's meaning.
In his study of six novels, Johnson argues the secondariness of social reform and philosophical speculation. Instead, Hardy's most profound achievement is the "linking of the ancient pastoral with the most advanced
evolutionism and phenomenology" (p. 128). By emphasizing the role the
classical otium plays in Hardy's use of the pastoral and tragedy and in Hardy's vision of the potential of modem consciousness, Johnson impedes any
tendency to limit Hardy's pastoral to nostalgia and tragedy to pessimism.
Johnson also very effectively and sometimes beautifully argues that Hardy's
explanations of human and nonhuman processes in tenns of one another
constitute a significant habit of mind; however it is not always clear why he
labels this habitual practice phenomenological rather than metaphorical. Perhaps this study is most compelling during the discussion of Hardy's indebtedness to a geological and anthropological sense of the human in time as
well as to a Darwinian enchantment with evolutionary connections among
all life ... above the infamous 'survival of the fittest'" (p. 115). Johnson's
measured unfolding of the confluence of these dispositions and influences
makes his book impressive.
In the act of underlining Hardy's preoccupation with the affinity between
the human and nonhuman, Johnson ends up inflating it at the expense of
l
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other preoccupations and posing firm boundaries between apparent opposites that Hardy tried to maintain in dynamic if not dialectic relationship.
Though he begins the book by steadily complicating the dichotomy between
otium and the aspiring mind in Far from the Madding Crowd and The Return of
the Native, by the end he neglects the perspective on opposites with which
he credits Hardy. Protagonists' severe conflicts with the competing claims of
systems and feelings, society and nature, are simplified to an either/or problem. The crucial problem of Jude the Obscure becomes "whether Jude fails because of society's and Oxford's shortcomings (whether we have a true
'reform' novel), or whether the failure does not lie in Jude's faith in learning
and Sue Bridehead" (p. 132). Because he cherishes Hardy's advocacy of a
new Nature as an expansion "beyond society and social relations," Johnson
isolates problems of society from the problems of individuals as Hardy does
not. That he can, in his discussion of Tess of the d'Urbervilles, invoke Hardy's
accepting stance toward the naturalness of sexuality and fecundity without
once mentioning the fact of pregnancy also indicates where Johnson stops in
his delineation of the complexity of Hardy. Few writers, male or female, have
considered as sympathetically and dejectedly as Hardy the clash between the
vagaries of desire and the concreteness of reproduction. The consequent social restriction of nature contemplated by Hardy as well as the adherence of
individuals to persistently inextricable social and natural laws even when
they work at cross purposes are sources of tragedy that Hardy resolved neither through analytical philosophy, nor reformist programs, nor recourse to
the natural. nor phenomenology.
Though questions of reform are, as Johnson claims, "secondary/' Hardy
never manages to isolate the secondary from his preferred primary vision in
the manner that leads Johnson to claim, "This continuity of consciousness
with 'lower' forms of life and finally with matter itself (in its dynamic and
evolutionary aspect) is, let there be no doubt, the very keystone of Hardy'S
art viewed phenomenologically" (p. 153). Ironically, in his ultimate emphasis
on Hardy's ideal consciousness as a solution to modern problems, Johnson
inadvertently retrieves the question of reform, transubstantiated through
idealism. This is a step Hardy never took; in taking it Johnson perhaps enables his very interesting project.
After trenchantly asserting the superiority of New Criticism over other
contemporary methodologies, William E. Buckler reads The Life of Thomas
Hardy as a quintessential expression, through both explicit statement and anecdotal form, of Hardy's sense of himself primarily as a poet rather than a
novelist or an individual. Then he assembles selected statements about poetry by Hardy in order to prompt readings that share Hardy'S and Buckler's
resistance to ideological and autobiographical concerns. In the next chapter,
Buckler offers exemplary readings of virtually all the poems in Hardy's first
volume, Wessex Poems and Other Verses, "as fair a slice of Hardy's poetic endeavors as any volume he published" (p. 199). By carefully directing attention to tone, prosodic phrasing, contradiction, melodrama, humor and the use
of understatement and cliches, Buckler compellingly traces disparities between the intentions and understandings of the speakers of the poems and
the poet. The book then ends with readings of the "In Tenebris" poems,
Poems of 1912-1913, and other selected poems from Satires of Circumstances
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and Moments of Vision, readings dedicated to disproving a tradition of emphasis on Hardy's pessimism. Buckler credits Hardy's poetry with the power
to help liS "build a personal refuge against brute force and spiritual madness" (p. 198).
Buckler is correct that obsession with "ideological consistency and autobiographical trustworthiness ... impose ... an imaginatively intolerable burden of self-reference" (p. 46) on Hardy and deprive readers of learning and
feeling anything new or less accessible than opinions or facts. But he imposes
an equally intolerable burden when he defines the "serious" reader as "dedicated to the principle that only the direct, internal evidence of the poem is a
fit criterion for asserting its significance" (p. 169). Surely we must allow for
more variety of approaches and even idiosyncracies if people are to construct
"personal refuge" from such spare poems. Furthermore, some readers do not
share the assumption that personal refuge is a primary and exclusive value
and some of us see that assumption as ideological. For some readers, a poet
such as Hardy is interesting because of the achievements and the limitations
of both his speakers' perspectives and the implied perspective of the poet, as
well as because of the poet's policy of impersonation and depersonalization.
In understanding the speakers as both imaginative creations and refractions
of Hardy's warring impulses and thoughts, in part pinpointed through ideological and autobiographical investigations, the representative and the universal are distinguished. Such readers do not force a poet to stand for the
universal or fault him for not doing so. In contrast, Buckler constricts the
reader's attention to the play of language until it explodes into an appreciation of knowledge through myth, "the most valuable lesson that any of us
can learn" (p. 112); he whittles away at various levels on which poems can
be read in order to subsume poetry to archetypal myth.
The sublimity Buckler strives for, clearly indicated when he associates poetry and divinity early in the book, leads predictably not only to close readings that close out many meanings of individual poems, but also to summary
dismissal of a poem such as "The Ivy Wife" as only a description of ivy without any particularly solemn truth because it, "if one translates its allegory as
signifying the destructive/self-destructive effects of a clinging wife, is almost
violently bitter" (p. 158). The violently bitter, evasive, dogmatic and autobiographical Hardy deserve to be read alongside Buckler's Hardy "who wanted
to show people how to nurture the unpracticed poet in themselves, how to
discover the poetry of their own lives, and how, by what can legitimately be
called poetic perspective, to gain a degree of mastery over what might otherwise be a life devoid of solace" (p. 105). Only then can we benefit as Hardy
did from poetry and novels that evoke both the benefits and costs of mastery
over life through art and the decision to detach oneself philosophically and
artfully from closer scrutiny of the personal and the ideological.
Vanderbilt University

Mary Childers
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Joseph Conrad: A Chronicle by Zdsislaw Najder, trans. Halina Carroll-Najder.
New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983. Pp. xxi

+ 647.

$30.00.

Conrad Under Familial Eyes ed. Zdzislaw Najder, trans. HaEna Carroll-Najder.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Pp. xxi

+ 282.

$37.50.

The Collected Letters of Joseph Conrad: 1861-1897, vol. 1, ed. Frederick E. Karl
and Laurence Davies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp.
lxvii + 446. $39.50.
Zdzislaw Najder's Joseph Conrad: A Chronicle won the 1984 prize awarded
by the Modern Language Association for distinguished research by independent scholars (Mr. Najder has been in exile from his native Poland since 1981
and is currently director of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe). The
judges describe his work as a "major contribution to literary history, a solidly
documented biography that transcends mere narrative." His biography builds
carefully on documentation of the sort published in his Conrad Under Familial
Eyes and his earlier collection Conrad's Polish Background (1964). Unlike many
previous biographical critics of Conrad, Najder has a knowledge of the Polish
language, literature, and history. He is in the position of knowing some facts
which make earlier speculations appear foolish. As he notes in his "Introduction" to Conrad Under Familial Eyes, the documents simply knock dovm "irresponsibly fantastic statements" (p. xii) that Conrad's father was a "brooding,
humorless fanatic" or that his mother was a "'cold' and 'austere' person."
Najder is careful to separate what can be known from existing evidence from
what is mere speculation, and he is wary of going very far without such corroboration. He avoids using Conrad's fiction as evidence for biographical
generalizations and, in his "Preface" to Joseph Conrad: A Chronicle, he says
that he aims to provide Conrad's readers with "a chronicle of the writer's life
and thought, marginally touching his fiction, with which they can cope
themselves" (p. viii). The result is a study directed frequently against the excesses of previous biographers, but with only tangential reference to Conrad's stories. Najder claims (and deserves to get) recognition for his extensive
historical research, his speculative restraint, and his good common-sense
judgment. In short, he makes the realist's plea, that his story of Conrad has a
privileged relationship to reality, to the events of Conrad's life, which is more
than "mere narrative," in the words of the Modern Language Association
prize committee. What is missing from Najder's study is any plausible explanation of why Conrad created the fictional web, the shimmering haze of his
narratives like "Heart of Darkness" and Lord Jim.
Let's face it: literary biography is narrative, a form of historical fiction, a
combination of invention and plausible construction. The biographer can
tend to be an archivist, accumulating without any selectivity of judgment all
existing documents. This monumental approach is well illustrated in Tile Cn/leeted Letters of Josepll COl/rad: 1861-1897 where every extant letter, in English, French, or Polish, is collected and translated. Every reader approaches
this mass of documents with some sort of "screen" or framework of prior interest and sifts and arranges as he reads, casting some or most of the letters
into forgetfulness because they do not seem "interesting." or illuminJting to
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his concerns. A critic interested in the interaction of Conrad's French syntax
and his English practice will hold in memory letters in French which illustrate slightly odd turns of phrase replicated in Conrad's English prose. Another reader, interested in the economic basis of art, will count the shillings
and pence paid per word for fiction written by Conrad, balanced against the
outlay necessary for his daily household expenses. Other readers will likely
never remember such sorts of information once they have browsed through
the letters enclosed in this volume. What remains after a careful reading is
shaped largely by what questions are in the mind of the reader when he
takes up the letters.
If it is true that every book has somewhere its anti-book, and that the
whole enterprise of literary scholarship is to create and bring together the antithetical theses so that they neutralize each other, then the true begetter of
Najder's biography is Ford Madox Ford's Joseph Conrad: A Personal Remembrance (1924). Within sixty days of the death of his former friend and collaborator, Ford rushed into print his memorial promising that his account
"contains no documentation at all; for it no dates have been looked up, E:!ven
all the quotations but two have been left unverified, coming from the -author's memory. It is the writer's impression of a writer who vowed himself
impressionist. Where the writer's memory has proved to be at fault over a detail afterwards out of curiosity looked up, the writer has allowed the fault to
remain on the page; but as to the truth of the impression as a whole the
writer believes that no man would care-or dare-to impugn it" (p. 6). Typical of Ford's rather tenuous hold on reality, the text then wanders off into
wild constructions far from known historical fact-some adding to the drama
of the tale, others apparently self-serving aggrandizement of Ford's own role
in Conrad's life, others perhaps merely the result of his foggy memory arranging and constructing fragments of experience some twenty years gone
by. Conrad's English wife, Jessie, found this book "detestable" and wrote her
own recollection of her husband, who seemed to her unpredictable, moody,
almost childish. The projections of Ford and of Jessie Conrad were followed
by many others. We have a Freudian Conrad inhibited by sexual topics and
living in the shadow of his father, Apollo, the great Polish patriot. We have
also a swashbuckling, romantic Conrad duelling over a woman and sailing
the seven seas. There is an alienated Conrad, a Byronic Conrad, a Marxist
Conrad, until finally Najder says, "Enough of these waxworks figures, here is
the bare truth! Conrad was exactly like the ordinary man." To be sure, he
was an ordinary man who happened to write a half-dozen literary masterpieces in a language he did not really learn until he was an adult, whose father was confined in a foreign penal settlement for his impractical and
idealistic political beliefs, who was a ship's officer in the period of the crucial
transition from sail to steam shipping, and who travelled to remote corners of
what we now call the third-world looking at the impact of capitalism and
imperialism at the grinding edge of primitive cultures.
The interest in Najder's study is not only in the light it sheds on Conrad,
but also in the questions it raises about what biography is, and more broadly
how a text of any sort is connected to "reality." Najder feels that the proper
function of a biographer is "something of the function of a lexicographer. He
establishes the meaning of signs used by the given author by pointing not
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only at his intentions but, much more important, at his cultural background
and resources. The biographer's textual function does not essentially consist
in explaining private allusions or subconsciously used codes but in identifying the scope within which we can define the meanings of words, images,
and conventions employed" (p. vii). Given such a view, it is striking that
Conrad was a peculiarly mobile figure, both geographically and socially,
moving constantly from one context to another: Poland, Russia, France, England, the high seas; patriot's son, prisoner's dependent, family's pride and
despair, ship's officer, English man of letters.
It is no wonder that even "Conrad" (not his real name, of course) was not
sure who he was, and began early what Najder calls his auto-mythologizing,
creating" cherished various self-images, sometimes contradicting not only the
facts, but each other" (p, xi), Najder is quick to explain that such self-construction is not simply lying. It appears to be linked with Conrad's literary
creativity as a means of psychotherapeutic compensation. Najder assumes
that somewhere beneath all the twisting and fabrication there is a real Conrad cleverly hidden, but recoverable where facts can be found. I am not so
sure. In one sense, such a view will merely lead back to Freudian speculation. If the real Conrad is a bundle of socially unacceptable impulses repressed at great difficulty only to emerge in a displaced form in his dreamlike
fiction, the biographer's activity must be remote from Najder's project to act
like a lexicographer defining fields of context from which the meanings of
words blossom in orderly lexica. But Najder clearly focuses, not on the private personality, but on the public persona of his man. He does not speculate
about what might be so deep in Conrad's mind that even Conrad himself did
not know about it, but on what can be known about Conrad as he lived from
day to day in society, In this sense, Najder is apparently talking about public
roles available or acceptable in a given historical and social context, rather
than the private personality,
Consider one of Conrad's notorious falsifications: his idealization of the
nature of life on a sailing ship in the later Nineteenth Century. Historical
facts seem to indicate that such life was brutal, dangerous, dirty, often made
worse by the incompetence of co-workers, and only minimally supervised by
marine courts. Conrad created a myth of lean beauty, human dignity, companionship, and high professional and moral standards for the seaman's calling. Najder examines this. contrast between the "reality" of life at sea and
Conrad's myth and correctly prefers the unreal, "The subjective personal
truth is the essential truth" (p, 163), Ford would have said the same: Conrad's impression of the sea is more important than what life at sea "really"
was like. But perhaps the issue is deeper still.
Perhaps all those value-laden terms used to describe the "real" life at sea
are predicated on prior attitudes of the observer so that the "reality" that
seems brutal, dangerous, and dirty has been interpreted and screened by an
observer just as much as the contrary seeming "myth"? It is not so much a
situation of truth submerged beneath a fanciful imagining as of one impression balanced against its contradiction, both largely created by the observing
frame of reference.
What, then, would a biography be but an arbitrary construction screening
and shaping an impression of a pattern of behavior? Such public behavior is
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similarly shaped by the social and historical opportunities offered for action.
Najder perhaps maintains that his picture of Conrad is true because it corresponds with the best possible understanding of the expected public roles possible for Conrad to play in crucial periods of his life. What makes Conrad
interesting to the reader is, however, not the public role he played, but, in
the conflict of his private personality against the limitations of his publicly
possible identity, that he was able to expand his roles beyond all reasonable
expectations. It is as likely that he could tUrn into a fabulous bird and fly
away from his personal predicament in the early 18905, as that he would miraculously turn into a great novelist, English landowner, father and husband,
called "Conrad," Is this public face that he invented for himself really more
plausible than the fanciful images of him invented by Ford, Jessie Conrad, or
a host of subsequent biographers?
Najder's chronicle is the most weighty biographical study as yet of Conrad's background based on an analysis of historical data. It is a model of its
kind, although it could be argued that the kind of information it supplies is
largely beside the point so far as reading Conrad's work is concerned. Its interest is not so much what it tells us about Conrad, as in the questions it
raises concerning such issues as the projection of self in society, the relation
of one's public role to one's self-identity, and the connection of all narrative
to reality.

University of Wisconsin, Madison

Todd K. Bender

Emily Dickinson and the Problem of Others by Christopher E. G. Benfey. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1984. Pp. 131. $15.00.
I am sorry that I must begin my review of Professor Benfey's very bright,
very brief book on Emily Dickinson with a complaint. Throughout his discussion, he refers to me as Karl Miller, but that never was my name and isn't
now. It is a small gaffe, but I have not checked all of his references and do
not know if there are others.
Benfey's book takes up the issue that has concerned Dickinson critics the
most: How did this very private poet manage to relate-to the Universe, to
Nature, to Society, to other individuals, to anything at all outside herself?
How, given the importance to her of her privacy, did she ever connect?
Benfey begins by writing about Dickinson's poetry as an exploration of privacy. She knew her privacy as something aesthetically enabling. What Dickinson knew she needed was that something about her remain hidden from
the view of others. She had to keep a world to herself, even as she was fully
ambivalent about it: she felt the need to be left to herself, and feared that she
might be left out of the human circle altogether.
Among the "others" in Dickinson's life which Benfey discusses are her
neighbors. Nearness to something or someone was for her a problem of
knowledge. One cannot know the neighbor, and yet one can be near the
neighbor. She knew, he says, that nearness to others precludes knowledge of
them. Again, this is a very important issue, but again it is developed by Ben-
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fey all too briefly. He invokes Rilke in this discussion, but so sparely that
Rilke is actually of little help.
Dickinson's connection with the Universe and Nature, Benfey says, is
through a skepticism like Emerson's and Thoreau's: while one cannot know
with certainty that the world exists, we cannot live such skepticism about the
world' 5 existence. She may have needed her deep skepticism, but she also
knew that to live our lives we must forget OUf skepticism about the world.
This is a valuable point in our attempt to understand Dickinson's "Nearness
to Tremendousness," She knew she could not know the truth about Nature
and yet had to acknowledge her nearness and therefore had an involvement
with it. It is just that Benfey's discussion of this large issue is also much too
brief, and Emerson and Thoreau are used all too circumspectly to help us
understand her.
The final section in Benfey's little book has to do with Dickinson's concept
of her body and others' bodies. Although he finds her playing the role of anorexia in many of her poems ("It would have starved a Gnat/To live so small
as 1--"), Benfey also finds her a very sensual person in her connections with
others. Again, the arguments about her affirmation of the body are not explored very fully, and the parallels with Whitman are not developed fully
enough to be convincing.
As I hope I show, most of Benfey's points are very good ones. He gives
this private poet far more connections with "others" than I had realized myself. But I cannot understand why they aren't all developed much more fully.
Benfey explicates the unused Dickinson poems, and usually brilliantly, but
not very many of those. Benfey would like to make the claim that with the
example of Emily Dickinson, he can say something about "the sophistication
of American thinking in general," but his book is really much too small for
so large a claim.

San Diego State University

Karl Keller

The Transparent Lyric: Reading and Meaning in the Poetry of Stevens and
Williams by David Walker. Princeton and Guildford, Surrey: Princeton University Press, 1984. Pp. xx + 204. $21.00.
"Bare lists of words," Emerson maintains in "The Poet," "are found
suggestive to an imaginative and excited mind," and he goes on to report
that Lord Chatham would read in Bailey'S Dictionary when preparing to
speak in Parliament. What sort of speech, one wonders, would Lord
Chatham have delivered after reading this somewhat scrambled vest-pocket
dictionary compiled by William Carlos Williams?
Among
of
green
stiff
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old
bright
broken
branch
come

white
sweet
May
again
The reader of imaginative and excited mind has little difficulty recognizing in

this bare list of words suggestions of the familiar reverdie: "come / white /
sweet / May / again." He must then account for the preceding eight words
-two prepositions, five adjectives, and a noun. Here, the title _comes to his
rescue: "The Locust Tree in Flower." From that ikon, a possible syntax:
Among[the] stiff, old, broken branch[es and] bright green [leaves] of [the tree]
again come sweet white [blossoms of] May.
Ezra Pound was right as always when he told Williams in 1917, "The
thing that saves your work is opacity, and don't you forget it." His remark
applies precisely as he intended it to "The Locust Tree," for there it stands
without metaphysics, without mythology, without tendentious symbolizing.
But opaque, too, in a way Ezra didn't intend: the way it solicits the reader's
attention to words as words (Among of!), to the poem as thing. Like the Juan
Gris painting of a rose he so admired, Williams's "Locust Tree" stands in apposition to nature, emphatically separated from it. Though first published (in
this version) in 1934, it would not look out of place in the landscape of
Spring and All (1923), a territory colonized by the Objectivists in the early
thirties and the writers of "projective" or "open" verse in the fifties.
To Pound, Louis Zukofsky, Charles Olson, and Williams himself we are
indebted for what we know of "The Locust Tree" as machine. They neglected to tell us, or tell us only darkly, of the ghost in the machine. The
ghost has his book at last, in David Walker's fine study. Walker brings to our
attention the peculiar "transparency" of Williams's opacity. By dispensing
with an identifiable speaker in "The Locust Tree," by fracturing its syntax, by
omitting punctuation and even significant words, Williams invites the reader
into the poem to help determine its meaning. The reader thereby usurps the
role conventionally played by the persona in the dramatic monologue or
lyric, becoming himself the center of dramatic interest. At the same time, he
cannot help but notice the extent to which his role has been defined for him
by the poet; this "double consciousness" locates him simultaneously inside
the poem, as participant, and outside the poem, as voyeur.
In the two chapters Walker devotes to Williams, he makes a persuasive
case for the "transparent lyric" as a distinctive bridge between Symbolism
and the anti-Symbolist "poetics of indeterminacy" which Marjorie Perloff has
traced from Rimbaud through John Ashbery, John Cage, and David Antin.
One sees with new clarity the principles underlying movements as diverse as

Criticism, Vol. XXVII, no. 4: Book Reviews

431

Imagism, Vorticism, and Objectivism. So tactfully, so mOdestly does Walker
develop his thesis that neither the traditional critic nor the deconstructionist
is apt to take offense, and along the way he offers especially satisfying readings of such poems as "The Sea," "The Sea-Elephant," and "Chloe."
I cannot muster the same enthusiasm for the four chapters devoted to Wallace Stevens, though these manifest the same finesse and include first-rate
discussions of poems like "The Motive for Metaphor," "Someone Puts a
Pineapple Together," and "Study of Images 11." Compared with Williams's
more experimental poems, Stevens's are heavily armored, leaving few syntactic chinks through which the reader can enter. Their "transparency" is
therefore largely a function of their "impersonality." Not surprisingly,
Walker concentrates on Stevens's later poems rather than the earlier pieces,
which more often employ dramatis personae.
Like "determinate," "dramatic" is for Walker a relative term, and few will
quarrel with his assertion that the Stevens poems he selects are relatively
undramatic in the conventional sense: they do not embody the speaking
voice in a fully realized persona. Yet the reader is unlikely, I think, to mistake Stevens's meditating consciousness for his own, so idiosyncratic is the
diction, imagery, and syntax of the least "personal" of these poems. "The
Snow Man" is a case in point: according to Walker, this poem "requires the
reader to enter the snow man, to become 'nothing himself and look out at a
blank world through crystalline eyes" (p. 17). This he can do, Walker maintains, because there is no dramatized "I" to inhibit identification with the
snow man. But there is such an "1/' and he effectively diverts my attention
from the scene's nothingness to the possibilities latent in "shagged" junipers
and the sound of misery in the wind. He does so, in fact, against my better
judgment, since I prefer the snow man's objectivity (though not his nothingness) to the speaker's facile anthropomorphism.
A corollary of Walker's thesis, never fully elaborated, is that critics generally misread the poems of Stevens and Williams from an uncritical allegiance
to the "expressive" theory of literature-namely, that the work dramatizes
some facet of its author's inner life. The transparent lyricist has neither a self
to express (the Romantics) nor a medium (Eliot); rather, he seeks to put the
reader directly in touch with the phenomenal world or the contours of
thought, without interference from his own personality. Thus a Stevens
poem which seems to express Stevens's personal uncertainty is actually calculated to "establish a dialectical network, deliberately unresolved, which it
is up to the reader to fulfill" (p. 76). Plausible as this sounds, it doesn't circumvent the expressive theory. I am persuaded merely that Stevens has devised an oblique, stylistically ingenious way to communicate an uncertainty
that was once his own. To the transparent lyric as to the conventional dramatic lyric Horace's version of the expressive theory still applies: no tears in
the writer, no tears in the reader.
These reservations aside, I can recommend David Walker's The Transparent
Lyric both to students of the two poets whose work he discusses and to those
interested in modern poetic theory. The book demonstrates how much a sensitive critic can accomplish when armed, as Walker's preface has it, "with
no more theoretical ammunition than ... imagination and common sense"
(p. ix). Add to these what Emerson cans "excitement," and one has the corn-
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bination to he seen everywhere in this book, through Walker's transparently
readable prose.

Marquette University

Milton

J. Bates

Quixote Scriptures: Essays on the Textuality of Hispanic Literature by Elias L.
Rivers. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983, Pp. 164. $17.50.
The five chapters of Rivers's book are elegant and perceptive analyses of
various stages in the development of the Hispanic literary tradition as viewed
from the point of view of the concept of "textuality." Although Rivers never
defines the terms in any metacritically adequate sense, it is obvious that he is
not using it in any loose sense to refer to the "uniqueness" or "originality" or
"creative exemplariness" that serves as the controlling point of reference for
standard manuals of literary history. Rather, for Rivers "textuality" means
the unquestionably theoretical issue of the complex array of strategies
whereby literary discourse (itself a complex social, artistic, and ideologically
marked phenomenon) is embedded in or circumscribed by textual artificats,
River's metaphoric title underscores the thrust of his analysis: literary art in a
Western tradition like the Hispanic, despite the vast array of competing
"reality effects," is essentially a scriptural phenomenon, That is, literature is
an act of writing, and the modalities of writing-their ideologies and their
conventions-are, in this conception of critical analysis, more fundamentally
the basis for literary history than the study of themes, generic categories, or
the expressive (societal vs, individual) functions of individual texts,
The last chapter, "Spanish in a New World: An Epilogue," touches only on
a few examples that could serve as the basis for an examination of the textuality of Latin American literature (one that would surely be far more complex than any such history for Spain because of the competing national and
regional divisions of the almost useless generalization of "Latin America").
The truly solid contribution of Rivers's book lies in the five main chapters,
"The Spread of Alphabetic Culture: An Introduction" speaks of the various
literary, cultural, religious, and-above all else-linguistic traditions in the
Peninsula. "The Beginnings of the Spanish Tradition" surveys the basic
forms of Medieval literature in terms of the emergence of Castillian as the official literary and cultural dialect of the Spanish tradition and against the
backdrop of the textual modalities of the key literary documents of the
twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. The importance of classical and
French influences, the dialectical relationship between spoken vs, written
registers, and the development of hypotactic from para tactic style are essential points of reference for analyzing textuality, Although these issues are often to be found in standard literary histories, where they become exciting
new critical perspectives for Rivers is, precisely, the way in which they can
be integrated into a semiotic model of textuality.
The three Renaissance/Golden Age chapters likewise deal with the great
masters of what is considered the most original segment of Spanish literature, again from the point of view of the aforementioned concept of textual-
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ity: "Renaissance Experiments" (the Celestina, Garcilaso de la Vega, Luis de
Le6n, Juan Valdes, among others, with emphasis on the formation of the
standard literary language of Spain), "Baroque Age of Gold" (the dramas of
Lope de Vega and the poetic war of G6ngora vs. Quevedo), and "Cervantine
Dialectic" (Cervantes as the inevitable culminating point of reference).
The importance of Rivers's discussions of these works in the context of a
well articulated critical theory is that essentially a new model for studying
the literary history of Spain is proposed. After two decades in which Hispanic scholars have generally been concerned with rnicrocommentariesapplying to individual works various new critical approaches-Rivers's book
pulls together critical insights from one perspective of these microcommentaries, that of textuality. The result is that three complimentary audiences are
implicitly addressed by Quixotic Scriptures: specialists in Hispanic literary
scholarship who are familiar with the facts that Rivers recites but who have
not been accustumed to integrating them in terms of the theoretical concept
of textuality; students of Spanish literature who sorely need a historical overview of major texts from a point of view that is continuous with the microcommentaries to be found in the specialized journals when the student turns
from survey to monographic courses (the standard works available in English
are examples of literary historiography quite disconsonant with modern critical theory); nonspecialist readers who can only derive a greater respect for
Spanish literature surveyed in terms of a mature critical discourse.
Written in the tradition of synthesis of Erich Auerbach, Karl Vossler, Ramon Menendez Pidal, and Otis Green, Quixotic Scriptures is marred only by
the author's regrettable decision to eschew the standards of scholarly documentation. Thus, the reader will find it difficult to pursue through footnotes
the sources of some of Rivers's assertions, general matters of theoretical underpinning, and the interrelations between his analyses and those of other
scholars with whom his comments are in both agreement and disagreement.
I find the rendering of San Isidoro in English as Saint Isadore of Seville
curious.
Arizona State University

David William Foster

On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature by Geoffrey
Galt Harpham. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. xxiii + 230.
$22.50.
After one has taken stock of the mass of ideas and information on the grotesque which this book provides, one asks oneself, as one does whenever an
academic work seems to transcend itself: what is it really after? Or, at least,
what is the motivation, either deliberate or unconscious, behind it? (As Harpham himself puts it, "Stories begin with something that means too much ").
I think it no accident that Flannery O'Connor figures prominently in Harpham's Conclusion, and that some of his most telling insights occur in the
pages devoted to that author. Perhaps, as in O'Connor, there is in this book,
too, "something to see, some connection between the apparent or the refer-
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ential story, which may amuse or appall, and a shadow-story mysteriously
inhering in the apparent one" (pp. 186-187). Harpham remarks that if O'Connor's characters "pursue the invisible with carnal eyes, they may be grotesque, but they are nonetheless saved" (p. 186). Salvation for O'Connor is
"constant and universal" (p. 188); it is not so much grasped directly as acknowledged within the imperfect, which is all we can know. Even the good
is grotesque (p. 188). "The goal is beyond the grotesque, but once you have
arrived at the grotesque, you have also arrived at the goal" (pp. 188-189). If
some sort of eschatology lurks in the grotesque, possibly it also underlies a
preoccupation with the grotesque.
At any rate, if there be some obscurely funded spiritual impulse, perhaps
in the tradition of the Pseudo-Dionysius, behind this work, it certainly does
not interfere with the book's scholarly business. The first half deals primarily
with art, the second with literature: the artistic examples are, for the most
part, pre-Baroque; part II moves forward with chapters on Poe, Emily Bronte,
Conrad, and Mann. The book is well illustrated; it combines abundant historical material with a steady application to theoretical questions relative to the
grotesque, such as liminality, disorder, contradiction, periphery vs. center,
and the role of the disgusting in art. When, for instance, Harpham explores
the ways in which the organic and the mental, or the anguished and the
objective (p. 120), interpenetrate in Poe (pp. 112-113), he is aware of debates
in recent linguistic theory over comparable issues, such as the interaction of
speech with the dead letters of phonetic alphabets (p. 119). But, although
Harpham quotes Derrida extensively, he does not cite the apposite passages
on framing and on the loathsome in Derrida's discussions of Kant (d. Mark
Krupnick, ed., Displacement: Derrida and After [Bloomington, Indiana U.P.,
1983J, pp. 43-46, "Grotesquerie"); Buckminster Fuller's inside-outside models would also have some relevance for Harpham's argument. I understand
that this volume will pave the way for Harpham's next project, which investigates some major issues in medieval religion, such as asceticism and temptation, in relation to modern philosophy and language theory (Bakhtin,
Wittgenstein). If it is of the same quality as this book, it will be well worth
waiting for.

State University of New York, Buffalo
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Three Sad Races: Racial Identity and National Consciousness in Brazilian Literature by David T. Haberly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp.
198. $24.95.
The question of national consciousness haunts the literatures and thought
of emerging and/or powerless nations; self-definition articulates what a nation sees as distinctive and particularly valuable in itself, and prepares from
within the face it will present for the recognition of the outside world. American literature and criticism of the early nineteenth century, for instance, are
full of this preoccupation with self-definition and self-assertion, a subject
which has now retreated from the mainstream to persist in the stronger and
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more vital pockets of its regional and so-called ethnic literatures. But the
question is still alive in much of the best literature of the Third World, and
Haberly sees it as central to the entire history of Brazilian literature, where its
most insistent affirmation is that Brazilian culture is exemplary and unique in
having achieved and in valuing racial harmony.
The title chosen for the book expresses the centrality of the racial component in Brazilian self-definition and evaluation not only in its wording but
also in its origin: "three sad races" comes from a widely anthologized poem
by a most proper and unadventurous poet, assigned in schools as expressive
of a truth about Brazilian identity: "loving bloom of three sad races." In the
Introduction, a clear, accurate, and dispassionate analysis of the facts and
ideology in the history of the contact between races in Brazil, Haberly invites
his American readers to take an imaginative leap out of the cultural matrix in
which they live, and to conceive of a different definition of race from that
which they take for granted. He asks them to imagine not a fixed classification of people into discrete racial categories, but a racial continuum, forming
a system in which "the racial identity of any individual-his or her position
on the continuum-is not necessarily fixed and immutable. . but is constantly redefined by the perceptions of others, perceptions that can vary
greatly from region to region and within different social settings" (p. 3).
This special nature of race relations in Brazil, and the consciousness of its
uniqueness among Brazilians is the first principle Haberly posits as a basis for
his analysis of the continuity and coherence in Brazilian literary history. The
second is unexpected, for it considers the place of the literary profession
within the culture: literature is one of the possible "escape hatches" that allow movement along the social and racial continuum, effecting, as needed, a
lightening of the skin or a deepening of the soul. Thus armed, Haberly can
deal effectively not only with the history of Brazilian literature and with its
traditional function as a vehicle for the expression of national character and
aspirations, but also with individual writers and works. His approach yields
good results when applied to writers on any point of the racial continuum: it
can explain the logic that makes the white Castro Alves and his readers identify with the plight of black slaves and that which makes the mulatto Machado de Assis weave the social disadvantages of his color into his work so
indirectly as to allow readers and critics not to see them. It can explain the
logic of Con~alves Dias's "Song of Exile," perhaps the best-known of all Brazilian poems, as expressing the alienation of a son of all three "sad" races in
so compelling and acceptable a form that parts of it were incorporated into
the national anthem, where "sadness" has no place; and it can find the congruence between the ethereal white forms and the subjacent violence of the
poems by the great (black) symbolist poet Cruz e Sousa.
The initial chapter tracing the course of Brazilian literature during colonial
times, as well as the chapters on the poets Gon~alves Dias and Castro Alves,
and the novelist Jose de Alencar are acute and concisely informative, providing enough background to show that the greatest Brazilian writers are not
sudden blooms in a desert and that the themes of race and national consciousness are present and important from the very beginning of Brazilian
times. These chapters also offer, like the rest of the book, an extra pleasure in
Haberly's translations, which are presented to illustrate specific theoretical
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observations but turn out to be little literary gems in themselves, apt at finding the English equivalents to typically Brazilian meanings and Portuguese
linguistic tricks, and particularly good at staying close to the feel of Romantic
poetry without becoming cloying. The translations of Cruz e Sousa are not
only good, but also especially useful: the poet has never been studied, in Brazil, with the attention he deserves, and one can hope that his works will now
gain new readers.
The chapter on Cruz e Sousa is probably the most original and useful in
the book, partly because, although the poet is regularly anthologized and
hailed (it is an ironic situation) as the greatest Brazilian representative of the
French symbolist school, very little serious criticism has been written about
him and Haberly's intelligent analysis is a major contribution to it, even if it
indicates that under certain circumstances, the "escape hatch" may jam. But
it is in the chapters on Machado de Assis and Mario de Andrade, more
widely studied authors, that the power of Haberly's approach is most clearly
displayed.
Haberly generalizes from national to personal identity, and connects the
common Brazilian self-definition as a mixed people with Machado's problemridden view of his own place, given his mixed ancestry, in Brazilian societya society whose tolerance toward partially non-white individuals is less pronounced than its pride in generalized racial tolerance would lead one to expect. Thus he accounts, convincingly, for many of the indeterminacies in
Machado's fiction, which traditional criticism tends to explain in terms of
purely psychological categories like "subtlety" or, if sociologically inclined, in
terms of concepts like the inconsistencies of bourgeois ideology.
Haberly also finds original sense in some of the central images of Mario de
Andrade's poetry and of his great prose poem Macunaima. Other critics have
written on the recurrent figure of the harlequin in Mario's work, but even the
more authoritative skirt the implication that the colors in the figure's costume, significantly juxtaposed, rather than mixed, might have specifically racial and not just generally psychological connotations. Indiscreetly, Haberly
says what Brazilians usually only hint at when they publish a photo of Mario
de Andrade in most editions of his work: that he not only contributed to the
Brazilian literature of racial identity as part of the discourse on national consciousness, but that he did it from the perspective of his own mixed ancestry.
Though fruitful and enlightening, Haberly's approach does raise a few
questions. After having traced the consistent historical discrepancy between
one of the central tenets of Brazilian national consciousness and Brazilian social realities, and the effect of that discrepancy on the lives and works of the
nation's greatest writers, Haberly concludes somberly that alienation is the
hallmark and only authentic position of the great Brazilian writers. The observation is apposite, but one should also remember that apart from the Arcadians of the late eighteenth century, all the greatest Brazilian writers-and
certainly all those writing after colonial times-produced their work after
Romanticism, for various historical and sociological reasons, had made alienation into an inescapable idiom of their craft. It is possible, of course, that the
specifically racial component of that alienation makes it unique and qualitatively different from what is expressed in other Romantic or modernist
works. With good reason, Haberly makes no such claim which would, at its
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limit, make of the difference between Brazilian and North American definitions of race a mere index of Brazilian failure.
The considerations above lead to a further question: given that both Machado de Assis and Mario de Andrade chose to keep a pointed silence on the
matter of their own race, what critical attitude is most respectful of their genius and faithful to their works? Traditionally, Brazilian critics have followed
the writers' leads and thus helped perpetuate and keep invisible the mythical, not to say dishonest, component of the Brazilian ideology of racial tolerance. Haberly's approach does greater justice to more of the contents of their
works, but also robs them of some of the universality they had so dearly
bought with their-culturally coherent-silence. This might be just a pseudodilemma, solved by stating that Haberly simply provides a corrective to traditional critical mystification, if his study were not inserted in its own cultural
context, and had not found one kind of intelligibility in Brazilian literature
that makes it more easily accessible to a differently race-conscious American
public for which it should be difficult to read an author of mixed ancestry,
from a Third-World country as a racially unmarked spokesman for the condition of men like themselves, members of a culture of equivalent value. His
dissection of the ideology of racial tolerance is valid, but does not acknowledge that ideology is not an innocent word either: it implies a lie, and invites
demythification so insistently that one forgets that it also points to a form of
reality, and that it has a teleological dimension: Brazil would like to be as tolerant as it says it is, and sometimes it acts in the direction of that desire. In
short, when he makes racial consciousness the central concept of his analysis,
Haberly chooses a strong tool which makes it possible for him to discern the
roots of the subtleties, and explain the mysteries and inconsistencies, of even
the greatest of Brazilian writers. But the very consistency and cohesiveness of
his analysis enjoins it from taking into consideration the way in which the
particular attitude of Brazilian culture toward race broadened the scope of its
authors, making the specific form of their alienation central to its self-definition, and thus reintegrating their separateness.
Thus Haberly's book has the additional, if probably unsought-for merit of
reproducing in its very structure the dilemma of self-definition in emerging
and/or powerless nations: that of being forced to adopt a language which deflects the account of its defining characteristics in the direction of meanings
acceptable and intelligible by outside observers, if it is to make itself known
and less misunderstood.
If the above are strictures, they are of the sort that could only be made
against a critical work that is itself solid, thoughtful, coherent and, within its
self-chosen limits, complete. Haberly's is the rare study of a little-known literature that does not get lost in details, that speaks to the beginner without
condescension, and to the expert with originality, that is informative and
thorough, and that also opens the way for further, serious, discussions.
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